Dynastic inequality, mobility and equality of opportunity by Kanbur, Ravi & Stiglitz, Joseph E.
J Econ Inequal (2016) 14:419–434
DOI 10.1007/s10888-016-9328-4
Dynastic inequality, mobility and equality of opportunity
Ravi Kanbur1 · Joseph E. Stiglitz2
Received: 7 March 2016 / Accepted: 10 March 2016 / Published online: 13 July 2016
© Springer Science+Business Media New York 2016
Abstract One often heard counter to the concern about rising income and wealth inequal-
ity is that it is wrong to focus on inequality of outcomes in a “snapshot”. Intergenerational
mobility and “equality of opportunity”, so the argument goes, is what matters for normative
evaluation. In response to this counter, we ask what pattern of intergenerational mobility
leads to lower inequality not between individuals but between the dynasties to which they
belong? And how does this pattern in turn relate to commonly held views on what con-
stitutes equality of opportunity? We revive and revisit here our earlier contributions which
were in the form of working papers (Kanbur and Stiglitz 1982, 1986) in order to engage with
the current debate. Focusing on bistochastic transition matrices in order to hold constant
the steady state snapshot income distribution, we develop an explicit partial ordering which
ranks matrices on the criterion of inequality between infinitely lived dynasties. A general
interpretation of our result is that when comparing two transition matrices, if one matrix is
“further away” from the identity matrix then it will lead to lower dynastic inequality. More
specifically, the result presents a computational procedure to check if one matrix dominates
another on dynastic inequality. We can also assess “equality of opportunity”, defined as
identical prospects irrespective of starting position. We find that this is not necessarily the
mobility pattern which minimizes dynastic inequality.
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1 Introduction
It is clear that global economic forces are now aligned to produce rising income and wealth
inequality. There is, of course, disagreement about the relative importance of the potential
drivers of these changes. The direction of technical change appears to be favoring capital over
labor and, within labor, skilled labor over unskilled labor. Globalization of trade and invest-
ment is transmitting these forces to all countries, and may itself be a contributor to growing
inequality. Across a wide spectrum of countries, there has been an increase in market
power at least in certain sectors, and arguably, more broadly in rent seeking.1 In Latin
America these underlying forces have been countered by pro-active policy. But elsewhere,
including in Asia, Europe and the US, policy has not countered, and perhaps has even exac-
erbated, the forces for rising inequality. Not surprisingly, rising inequality is now of great
concern to policy makers and the general public the world over. The phenomenal response
to the book on inequality by Thomas Piketty (2014) is but one illustration of these concerns.
One often heard counter to the concern on rising inequality is that it is wrong to focus on
inequality of outcome in a “snapshot”. What is important is how income or wealth evolves
over time, especially across generations.2 Intergenerational mobility, so the argument goes,
is what matters for normative evaluation. These arguments have resurfaced in the post-
Piketty debates, but have actually been ever present in the discourse on inequality and public
policy. Thus Friedman (1962) writes as follows in Capitalism and Freedom:
Consider two societies that have the same annual distribution of income. In one there
is great mobility and change so that the positions of particular families in the income
hierarchy varies widely from year to year. In the other there is great rigidity so that
each family stays in the same position year after year. The one kind of inequality is a
sign of dynamic change, social mobility, equality of opportunity; the other, of a status
society. The confusion between the two kinds of inequality is particularly important
precisely because competitive free enterprise capitalism tends to substitute the one for
the other.
Friedman (1962) uses the phrase “equality of opportunity” which has also received a
great deal of attention in recent years. Roemer (1998), in particular, has attempted to formal-
ize the concept by distinguishing between two types of factors to which snapshot inequality
might be attributed – circumstances and effort. Circumstances are those factors which are
outside the individual’s control and effort is the term for those factors for which society
holds the individual responsible. A move towards equality of opportunity would reduce the
influence of circumstances on outcome.
1See Stiglitz (2013).
2Some have argued that inequalities in life time incomes is much less than inequalities observed at any
moment of time: in any particular year, some individuals may have a high income, others a low income, but
these average out over time. Arguing that consumption is related to permanent income, some, looking at the
variability of consumption, suggest that the variability of permanent income must be much lower than the
variability in outcomes in any one year. Data before the crisis for the US contaminates the analysis, since a
large fraction of Americans in the bottom 80 % seemingly believed that they had a much higher permanent
income than they did. In any case, this theoretical paper can be made to apply to either context, with an
important distinction made below.
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Whether one can separate out circumstances from effort, empirically or even perhaps
conceptually, is a live debate (see Arneson (2014), Kanbur and Wagstaff (2016)).3 But in an
intergenerational context Roemer’s (1998) concept has had many precursors. Thus Nancy
Stokey (1998) writes as follows:
But we care about the sources of inequality as well as its extent, which is why we dis-
tinguish between equal opportunity and equal outcomes. To what extent is the claim
that our society provides equal opportunity justified? How can we tell?....I am going
to take the position that if economic success is largely unpredictable on the basis
of observed aspects of family background, than we can reasonably claim that soci-
ety provides equal opportunity. There still might be significant inequality in income
across individuals, due to differences in ability, hard work, luck, and so on, but I will
call these unequal outcomes.
On the other hand, if economic success is highly predictable on the basis of family
background, then I think it is difficult to accept the claim that our society provides
equal opportunity. In this case accidents of birth– unequal opportunity–are primary
determinants of economic status.... Consequently, on a first pass we can judge whether
there is equal opportunity by looking at parents and their children to see whether the
economic success of the children is determined in large part by the success of their
parents.
Whether current inequality in turn influences intergenerational mobility is an important
question, as discussed in the recent review by Corak (2013), and by Roemer in applying
his distinction between circumstances and effort to the intergenerational context (Roemer,
2004).4 But the other side of the causal link is equally important: whether less mobility
leads to more inequality in the next generation. There could be an adverse feedback pro-
cess, where more inequality today leads to less mobility, and that in turn leads to still more
inequality in the subsequent generation, and so forth. There is now considerable evidence
of the existence of a correlation between a simple measure of mobility (intergenerational
correlations) and a simple measure of inequality of outcomes (Gini coefficient); and there
is some literature arguing that there is evidence for both parts of the causal structure.
This paper, by contrast, focuses largely on normative issues, but underneath these nor-
mative issues are complicated relationships between mobility and observed outcomes. We
wish to know whether, for instance, societies with more mobility necessarily have a higher
level of social welfare, using the economists’ standard welfare framework.5 Within such a
normative framework, Stokey (1998) and Friedman (1962) seem to suggest that societies
with more mobility have higher levels of social welfare, regardless of the degree of inequal-
ity in outcomes observed at any moment of time. To evaluate such claims, one needs to
have a more general understanding of both what we mean by more mobility and an explicit
normative framework. Well before Stokey (1998), Atkinson (1981a, b) had characterized
3However, both at the theoretical and at the empirical level, both in normative and descriptive models, there
is much discussion of the links between inequality of outcomes and inequality of opportunity. While the
theoretical work describes mobility in terms of transition matrices (the likelihood of moving from one income
level to another), empirical work focuses on correlations, typically simple correlations between the income
of a child and the income of the parent(s).
4There is now a growing literature in this vein; see Aaberge, Mogstad and Peragine (2011).
5Of course, many would claim that the economists’ standard framework, generalizations of utilitarianism, is
badly flawed. We care about fairness, and fairness is defined by equality of opportunity. In this view, equality
of opportunity is a value in its own right. We will not have anything more to say on this alternative framework
here.
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equality of opportunity in terms an intergenerational transition probability matrix with iden-
tical rows, and Shorrocks (1978) had referred to this zero correlation between parents’
income and children’s prospects as “perfect mobility”. Atkinson and Shorrocks, and others,
had also noted an alternative type of transition matrix which might capture the notion of
high mobility, namely one with strong negative correlation between parents’ income and
children’s expected prospects, and Shorrocks (1978) noted that these two views – “equality
of opportunity” and “negative correlation” – were not necessarily consistent with each other.
We can of course make a direct set of arguments favoring one of these views, and some
of the literature does this.6 But much of the literature relates views on intergenerational
mobility to specific social welfare functions, on the grounds that this allows precision on the
nature of the value judgments in play. Starting from the early work of Atkinson (1981a, b),
and Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) there is now a very large literature in this vein. Our
earlier working papers, Kanbur and Stiglitz (1982, 1986) were in this strand of literature,
with a particular focus on dynastic inequality. Since those papers, the literature has seen
tremendous growth.7 However, the particular result and characterization we presented then
has not been covered in this literature, and we are reviving our earlier work in this paper to
engage with the current debate on mobility as a normative counter to inequality. In particu-
lar, we wish to ask, what pattern of intergenerational mobility leads to lower inequality not
between individuals but between the dynasties to which they belong? And how does this
pattern in turn relate to commonly held views on what constitutes equality of opportunity?
The plan of the paper is as follows. Section 2 introduces the notation of intergenerational
transition matrices, and reviews the basic literature to set up the analytical problem we are
addressing. Section 3 presents a characterization result which allows a partial ordering on
intergenerational mobility matrices with respect to dynastic inequality. Section 4 interprets
and discusses the result through particular examples. Section 5 concludes with an agenda
for future research.
2 The model and a standard result
Let us specify the n x n transition matrix:
A = ‖aij‖; aij ≥ 0,
n∑
j=1
aij = 1 (1)
whose typical element aij is the probability of movement from income category i to income
category j . In our case the transition can best be thought of as inter-generational.8 Let there
be n categories of incomes with income levels
y1 ≤ y2 ≤ y3 ≤ . . . ≤ yn (2)
6Thus “equality of opportunity” type characterizations have been appealed to directly by Roemer (1998) and
by the earlier literature of which Dworkin (1981) is a prime example.
7Comprehensive surveys of the earlier literature include the one by Fields and Ok (1999). Examples of papers
in this vein include Markandya (1984), Chakravarty, Dutta andWeymark (1985) and Dardanoni (1993). More
recent references are given in Corak (2013) and in Amiel et al. (2013).
8If the incomes are those of an individual in a particular year, and there were perfect capital markets, all that
would matter is the present discounted value of income over his life, i.e. if individuals lived for two periods
and the interest rate were zero, it is the inequality in yt + yt+1 that we would study. This is a very special
case of the more general model that we formulate below, with a linear utility function. Implicitly, in our more
general formulation, we do not allow intertemporal smoothing.
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For simplicity, the transition matrix A will be assumed to be constant over time and, where
appropriate, the probability that a particular income category is occupied will be identified
with the proportion of people who actually end up in that category.
An oft-encountered view on what constitutes greater mobility may be characterized as
the “diagonals view”. Thus a transition matrix A = ‖aij‖ is said to exhibit greater mobility
than a transition matrix B = ‖bij‖ if aii ≤ bii for all i with strict inequality for some i, in
other words each diagonal element of A is no larger than the corresponding diagonal element
of B. A “strong diagonals view” can be characterized as saying that aij ≥ bij for all i = j
with strict inequality for some i = j . Shorrocks (1978) called this property of a mobility
matrix “monotonicity”.
The extreme of immobility in the “diagonals view” is of course the case of the Identity
matrix:
A = I ; aij = δij =
{
1 for i = j
0 for i = j (3)
In this case, families’ status remains unchanged generation after generation. Strong mono-
tonicity simply means that there is a smaller probability of remaining in the same position,
and a higher probability of going into every other position.
The other extreme is sometimes argued to be the matrix which has ones along the non-
leading diagonal and zeros elsewhere:
A = K; aij = kij =
{
1 for j = n + 1 − i
0 for j = n + 1 − i (4)
Atkinson (1981a) calls this the case of “complete reversal”. Those at the bottom move to the
top and vice versa. Atkinson contrasts this with another view of perfect mobility, namely
that of “equality of opportunity” as indicated by independence of future prospects from the









where a′ represents the vector of transition probabilities.
Shorrocks (1978) also uses (5) to define his property PM (“perfect mobility”). As
Shorrocks goes on to show, one cannot both hold the “diagonals view” and the “equality of












it should be clear that A is better than B on the diagonals view while the reverse is true on the
equality of opportunity view. This disjuncture came to be well appreciated in the technical
literature which developed since the work of Shorrocks and Atkinson (see for example the
survey by Fields and Ok (1999)), and yet one finds both views present in the discourse on
intergenerational mobility.
There has been considerable development in the literature through specification of
explicit dynastic social welfare functions. Consider a two period world with dynasty i cur-
rently having income yi . Thus income in the next period is yj with probability aij , from
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If poi is the proportion of total units in category i, then social welfare will be some function









This is, in fact, the social welfare function considered by Atkinson (1981a, b). Let us now
impose the condition that income transitions are in a steady state, so that the snapshot
distribution of income remains unchanged over time.10 Then
p0 = p1 = p∗







aij = 1 (9)
















i.e. equal numbers in each category. The bistochastic assumption is made by Atkinson
(1981a, b) and the subsequent literature to focus on the pure consequences of mobility,
independent of the impact on the long run snapshot distribution of income.11
Focusing then just on mobility, and by analogy with multivariate stochastic dominance, a
condition is derived by Atkinson (1981a, b) for one transition matrix to give a higher social
welfare than another for a class of social welfare functions. If
A = ‖aij‖ and B = ‖bij‖
are the two transition matrices being compared and social welfare is given by (8) with
poi = p∗i = 1n for all i, then it can be shown that










(aij − bij) ≤ 0 for all k,m. (11)
This condition on transition matrices is essentially equivalent to the cumulative of the
bivariate distribution of (yi, yj) being nowhere greater in society A than in society B.




10Kanbur and Stromberg (1988) is an example of a line of work which assesses the dominance properties of
income distributions p0, p1, ...., pt .
11This is also referred to as the distinction between “structural mobility” and “exchange mobility” the latter
being the case where the snapshot distributions are held constant.
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The result in (11) gives a specific method of comparing intergenerational transition
matrices. Notice that according to this criterion although E dominates I, K dominates E.
Thus equality of opportunity does not necessarily lead to higher social welfare as specified here.
3 Mobility and dynastic inequality: a characterization result
We continue to assume a bistochastic transition matrix with the income distribution in steady
state. The bistochastic assumption is restrictive but (i) it focuses attention on “pure” mobility
or “exchange mobility” and (ii) as Atkinson (1981a) argues, if the income categories are
quantiles then the transition matrix is by definition bistochastic.12 Notice that since the
steady state of a bistochastic transition matrix has equal numbers in each category, we can
normalize to the situation where there is one person in each category. We will, however,
need to be careful and not give a strict cardinal interpretation to income levels yi associated
with each category.
We will further simplify the dynasty’s intertemporal utility to be the expected discounted
value of a given instantaneous utility function with a constant discount rate.
Then for a two period world dynasty i’s lifetime expected welfare is given by
Vi = U(yi) + γ
n∑
j=1
aijU(yj) ; i = 1, 2, ..., n (12)
where γ is the discount factor (lying between 0 and 1) and U(.) is the instantaneous utility
function. In this case the condition on W(.) in result (11) is satisfied with standard utility
functions U(.).
However, what happens in the case of dynasties which live more than two generations? In
this case the two period results of Atkinson (1981a, b), and the bivariate results of Atkinson
and Bourguignon (1982), are no longer valid. Indeed, it is not exactly clear what the analogy
would be for the condition on the social welfare function in the bivariate case, and how and
whether even a similar class of results could be derived.
Thus the Atkinson (1981a, b) results are somewhat limited in the long lived dynasties
case. In what follows we extend their analysis to the case of infinitely lived dynasties. If we
define13
U∼ = (U(y1),U(y2), ...,U(yn))
′ (13)
as the column vector of utilities of income, then we can stack the expressions in (12) to give
V∼ = U∼ + γAU∼ (14)
where V∼ is the vector of dynastic expected welfares. For a T generations world (14) becomes
V∼ = [I + γA + γ
2A2 + ... + γ TAT ]U∼ (15)
12Key papers in the literature make further restrictive assumptions, for example the assumption that a matrix
is “monotone” in other words, the rows of the matrix from a sequence of stochastic domination (Dardanoni,
1993). Dardanoni, Fiorini and Forcini (2010) argue that this assumption is borne out in reality. However, the
income categories corresponding to say the deciles differ across societies, and we may also care a great deal
about those.
13This approach from Kanbur and Stiglitz (1982, 1986) was also followed for example by Dardanoni (1993).
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if we let T → ∞ then under standard conditions we get
V∼ = [I − γA]
−1U∼ (16)




1 − γ e∼
′U∼ where e∼
′ = (1, 1, ..., 1) (17)
so that the sum of dynastic welfare is the same for all transition mechanisms in this class.
This allows us to focus purely on the inequality of dynastic welfare. Instead of simply taking
the sum of V1,V2, ...,Vn, we will let social welfare be
S = S(V1,V2, ...,Vn) (18)
where S(·, ·, ... ·, ·) is now a symmetric, quasi-concave function, assumptions which
are meant to capture, respectively, anonymity and egalitarianism with respect to dynastic
prospects.
Our object is to rank transition matrices according to the social welfare function (18).
Denote V∼
A and V∼
B as the vector of lifetime utilities under two transition matrices A and B:
V∼
A = [I − γA]−1U∼
V∼
B = [I − γB]−1U∼ (19)
and let
SA = S(V∼
A); SB = S(V∼
B) (20)
we can now state the basic result of this section:
Proposition SA ≥ SB for all symmetric, quasi-concave S(.) for all (y1, y2, .....yn) and all
U (.) which are unique up to a positive linear transformation, if and only if there exists a
bistochastic matrix Q such that
B = 1
γ




[I − Q] + AQ
⇒ [I − γB] = [I − γA]Q
⇒ [I − γA]−1 = Q[I − γB]−1
⇒ [I − γA]−1U∼ = Q[I − γB]
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where the vector Vˆ∼
A
is ordered so that Vˆ A∼1 ≤ Vˆ A∼2... ≤ Vˆ∼
A
n
, and PA is the appropriate
permutation matrix. Similarly, use an appropriate permutation matrix PB to reorder V B∼ to
Vˆ∼
B





A = PAQ P−1B PBV∼
B
⇒ Vˆ∼





It is easy to check that the inverse of a permutation matrix is itself a permutation matrix and


















) = S(V B); so that
S(V∼
A) ≥ S(V∼




B) for all symmetric quasi-concave functions S(.), all (y1, y2,





B) by symmetry of S(.)
⇒ there exists a bistochastic matrix Qˆ such that
Vˆ∼
A = Qˆ Vˆ∼
B
from Dasgupta, Sen and Starrett (1973), Theorem 1
⇒ P−1A Vˆ∼









A = Q V∼
B
⇒ [I − γA]−1 U∼ = Q[I − γB]
−1 U∼
⇒ [I − γA]−1 = Q[I − γB]−1 Since the above equality is true for all (y1, y2,
. . . .., yn) and all U(.) unique up to a positive
linear transformation
⇒ B = 1
γ
[I − Q] + AQ
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and proof of necessity is completed.
We thus have a characterization result on intergenerational mobility – what two pat-
terns must look like so that we can say with confidence that dynastic inequality is lower
in one than the other.14 How does the result relate to conventional views on “more mobil-
ity” or “equality of opportunity”? The next section interprets the result in light of this
discourse.
4 Interpretations
It should be noted that the theorem of the previous section provides us with a necessary
and sufficient characterization result. Within the class of bistochastic transition matrices
and restricting ourselves to steady states; if we are not willing to specify the social wel-
fare function in any greater detail than that it be symmetric and quasi-concave in dynastic
expected welfares; and if we accept that lifetime utility is the present discounted sum of
von-Neumann Morgenstern expected utility over an infinite horizon; then to say that social
welfare is higher under transition matrix A than under transition matrix B, is equivalent to
saying that A and B stand in the relation
B = 1
γ
[I − Q] + AQ (21)
where Q is a bistochastic matrix. Of course, this is a very strong requirement. But under
the conditions stated this is all that can be said. One route for further research may be to
relax some of these conditions, but here we will restrict ourselves to relating (21) to some
conventional views on “greater mobility”.
Given any two bistochastic transition matrices A and B, from (21) we simply have to
check whether or not
Q = [I − γA]−1 [I − γB] (22)
is a bistochastic matrix. Then, and only then, will A’s welfare ranking be higher than that of
B for the class of social welfare functions being considered. Now using




it can be seen that
e∼
′Q = e∼
′ ; Q e∼ = e∼ (23)
Thus all that remains to be checked is whether each element of the matrix in (22) is non-
negative i.e. whether qij ≥ 0.
For any two matrices, calculation of (22) and checking if the resultant matrix is non-
negative is the operational method of identifying social welfare dominance in our setting.
It is the equivalent of the Lorenz curve comparison in the static case, and of the Atkinson
criterion (11) in the case of measuring mobility for two period dynasties.
Let us illustrate (22) with some examples. Start with an intuitively obvious case. How
does the identify matrix compare to other bistochastic matrices? Let B = I in (22) and let
14Dardanoni (1993) also presents characterization results for the class of monotone matrices.
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A be any other bistochastic matrix, noting that from the many steady state distributions for






, . . . , 1
n
) to maintain comparability. Then from (22)
Q = (1 − γ )[I − γA]−1 (24)
all of whose elements are non-negative. Thus any matrix in the bistochastic class is ranked
better than the identity matrix. Moreover, letting A = I in (22) we get
Q = 1
1 − γ [I − γB] (25)
some of whose off-diagonal elements will always be negative if B is not itself the identity
matrix. Thus I is not ranked better than any other bistochastic matrix. It is in this sense that
I is the unique globally “worse” transition matrix in the bistochastic class if the objective is
dynastic inequality.









































as the best in the class of bistochastic transition matrices. This is of course the matrix E in
(5) for the bistochastic case. Let us compare this with the matrix K defined in (4), where
correlation between one period’s income and the next period’s income is the most negative
it can be. First of all, let A = E and B = K in (22). Noting that E2 = E, it is easy to show
(as in Kanbur and Mukerji (1980)) that:
[I − γE]−1 = [I + γ
1 − γ E] (27)
so we have
Q = [I + γ
1 − γ E][I − γK]
= I − γK + γE. (28)
In deriving the final form of (28) we have used the fact that KE = E. Now from (28) and
the definition of K in (4),
i = j ; qij = γ (1
n






− 1) for j = n − i + 1 = i
γ
n
for j = n − i + 1 = i








1 − γ + γ 1
n
for i = n+12 (n odd)




Thus at least some elements of Q (those for which j = n − i + 1 = i) will be negative and
E cannot be established as unambiguously better than K.
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Can K be established an unambiguously better than E? Letting A = K , B = E in (22),
and noting that
[I − γK]−1 = 1
1 − γ 2 [I + γK] (30)
we get
Q = [I − γK]−1[I − γE]
= 1
1 − γ 2 I +
γ
1 − γ 2 K −
γ
1 − γ E (31)
hence
i = j ; qij = γ
1 − γ 2 kij −
γ








1−γ 2 − γ1−γ · 1n for j = n − i + 1 = i
γ
1−γ · 1n for j = n − i + 1 = i
i=j ; qij = 1
1 − γ 2 +
γ
1 − γ 2 kij −
γ








n(1−γ 2) + γ1−γ 2 for i= n+12 (n odd)
n−γ (1+γ )
n(1−γ 2) for other i
.
(32)
The only dimension for which the j = n− i+1 and j = i case is not a possibility is n = 2.
For n = 3, the element q23 , for example, satisfies j = n − i + 1 and j = i.
Thus in the 2×2 caseK is unambiguously ranked better thanE. However, more generally
the two cannot be ranked without specifying the social welfare function further.
In fact in the 2×2 case if we let
A =
[
α 1 − α




β 1 − β






q 1 − q
1 − q q
]
; q = 1 +
1
γ




Clearly in this case q is always non-negative and
β ≥ α ⇔ q ≤ 1 (35)
so that if B is worse than A on the “diagonals view” then, and only then, is it unam-
biguously worse from the dynastic inequality point of view. Of course, it should be noted
that in the 2×2 case the “diagonals view” and the “strong diagonals view” or “monotonic-
ity”, as Shorrocks (1978) called it coincide exactly. When presenting the incompatibility
of the equality of opportunity view with monotonicity in the context of the 2×2 exam-
ple. Shorrocks (1978) argued that “on balance monotonicity seems to be the less artificial
restriction”. The result here makes this intuition precise in the social welfare framework.15
Of course nocomparable general validation of the “diagonals view” is available for n ≥ 3.
15Amiel et al. (2013) argue that the negative correlation case is “only of theoretical interest since real world
mobility data never show complete reversal between parents and children’s economic positions”. However,
the issue is surely one of normative comparison rather than empirical regularity, in which case the negative
correlation case is valid one to consider in the framework of minimizing dynastic inequality.
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0 0 0 1
0 0 1 0
0 1 0 0





1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
1/4 1/4 1/4 1/4
⎤
⎥⎥⎦ (36)
On the diagonals view K is superior to E for n = 4. But we already know from (32) that
an unambiguous ranking on social welfare grounds is not available. More generally, for any
two bistochastic matrices A and B, let
D = B − A (37)



















(1 − aii) ≥ 0 (39)
Thus any two matrices which stand in the relation (21) satisfy the diagonals view. But the
converse is not true: any two matrices which satisfy the diagonals view need not necessarily
stand in the relation (21) to each other – the counter-example in (36) establishes that.







[I − Q + AQ]
B can thus be seen as a matrix-weighed sum of 1
γ
I andA, the weights beingQ and [I − Q].
If there exists a Q such that B can be written as this weighted sum, in a general sense
B is closer to the identity matrix than A. If interpreted in this wide sense, the “diagonals
view” has a rationale in a social welfare function that is egalitarian with respect to dynastic
prospects.





0.48 0.42 0.10 0.00
0.25 0.34 0.27 0.14
0.19 0.17 0.37 0.27






0.35 0.24 0.27 0.14
0.26 0.30 0.27 0.17
0.19 0.17 0.37 0.27






0.44 0.23 0.19 0.14
0.32 0.26 0.25 0.17
0.18 0.36 0.27 0.19
0.06 0.15 0.29 0.50
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
Matrix C is a father to son, quartile to quartile, transition matrix for hourly earnings in
Britain, derived from the work of Atkinson et al. (1983). Matrices A and B are alternative
specifications of father to son occupational transition matrices which are got by adjusting
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the Goldthorpe (1980) data from its seven classes into four and enforcing bistochasticity.
Atkinson (1981a) provides a fuller discussion of the procedure, but essentially matrix A has
been derived by shifting weight towards the diagonal and matrix B by shifting weight away
from the diagonal. Atkinson compares C with A and C with B using his criterion (11), and
finds that C and A cannot be so ranked, but that “the earnings transition matrix is welfare
inferior to case B of the occupational status matrix”.
Can the same be said of the matrices using our criterion? For γ = 0.5 (an intergenera-
tional interest rate of 100 %), we get the following Q matrices:




0.978 –0.111 0.051 0.082
0.035 0.953 –0.009 0.021
–0.002 0.095 0.947 –0.040
–0.011 0.063 0.011 0.938
⎤
⎥⎥⎦




0.948 –0.001 0.049 0.003
–0.034 0.016 0.016 0.002
0.009 –0.101 0.050 –0.042
0.076 0.086 –0.115 0.953
⎤
⎥⎥⎦
As in the case of Atkinson’s criterion,C cannot be ranked as better than A. However, what
is interesting is that B cannot be ranked as better than C, in contrast to the Atkinson finding.
Thus while it should be clear that there are a number of empirical problems in comparing
earnings transition matrices with occupational ones, our calculations nevertheless indicate
that a stress on dynastic inequality could alter rankings which emphasize intertemporal non-
separability.
5 Conclusion
The normative riposte to concerns about sharply rising inequality of income and wealth,
that it is intergenerational mobility and equality of opportunity which really matter, need to
be assessed with respect to specific social welfare functions which make explicit the value
judgments underlying the claim. An earlier literature, starting with the work of Shorrocks
(1978), Atkinson (1981a and 1981b), Atkinson and Bourguignon (1982) attempted to do
just this, and developed criteria for assessment of alternative patterns of intergenerational
mobility. Our contribution is in this vein, focusing on the implications of intergenerational
mobility for inequality among infinitely lived dynasties.
Restricting attention to bistochastic transition matrices in order to hold constant the
steady state snapshot income distribution, we have developed an explicit partial ordering
which ranks matrices on the criterion of dynastic inequality. A general interpretation of our
result is that when comparing two matrices, if one matrix is “further away” from the identity
matrix then it will lead to lower dynastic inequality. More specifically, the result presents a
computational procedure to check if one matrix dominates another on dynastic inequality.
We can also assess “equality of opportunity”, defined as identical prospects irrespective of
starting position, or identical rows of a transition matrix. We find that this is not necessarily
the mobility pattern which minimizes dynastic inequality, which requires instead a degree
of negative correlation between intergenerational outcomes.
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Much remains to be done. At the theoretical level, we can sharpen our ordering by
restricting the class of transition matrices, for example to those which satisfy stochas-
tic monotonicity as suggested by Dardanoni, Fiorini and Forcini (2010). The criterion we
have developed can be applied to intergenerational transition matrices which are now being
estimated with newly available data. The earlier literature on normative measurement of
mobility needs to be revisited and extended to address the revived concerns on inequal-
ity and mobility. Most importantly, the normative implications of the current inequality of
income for intergenerational inequality need to be assessed again with respect to alternative
sets of social welfare value judgments, perhaps bolstered by empirical investigation of peo-
ples’ views on mobility and inequality in its different dimensions, as developed by Amiel
et al. (2013). Specifically, if “equality of opportunity” as captured identical rows of a transi-
tion matrix (independence of future prospects from current income or wealth), does indeed
have normative significance as the best transition matrix, how do we reconcile this with the
outcome that it does not necessarily minimize dynastic inequality?
Acknowledgments We first started thinking about this issue in Oxford more than thirty years ago (see
Kanbur and Stiglitz (1982, 1986). We have returned to that line of enquiry and are reviving our earlier work
given the recent tendency to counter rising inequality concerns with the argument that what matters is not
inequality but mobility.
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